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NOTES AND COMMENTS
seem to amount to an unnecessary procedural delay caused by an absurd
prerequisite.
Yet, perhaps it is best that the Supreme Court be given the oppor-
tunity in every case to review the record on these important questions
of due process which so often involve fundamental rights. But, since a
denial of certiorari simply means that fewer than four members of the
court deemed it desirable to review a decision of a lower court, and in
no way is an adjudication on the merits, 23 the discretionary power of
the lower federal courts to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus
should not be disturbed. By keeping the doors of the lower federal
courts open the chances of injustice are thereby reduced to a minimum.
Therefore, if a state prisoner believes his case still has merit after
certiorari has been denied, he should not hestitate to petition the lower
federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus. But, if in the meantime, new
evidence has been 'discovered, then it would be advisable for him to first
seek a determination of the question in the state court as suggested in
Stonebreaker v. Smyth.
24
Thus, it would seem, that if this procedure is left open for a state
prisoner to follow, not only will the doctrine of comity be promoted,
but also the benefits of the "great writ" will be preserved.
WILLIAm L. MILLS, JR.
Limitation of Actions-Effect of Part Payment of Principal
or Interest on Non-Paying Obligor
In North Carolina a part payment by one of a number jointly or
jointly and severally bound, will start the statute of limitations running
anew as to all others of the same class,1 but if the payment is made
after the remedy is barred it will not bind those not making the pay-
2Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 71 Sup. Ct. 9 (1950); Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 917 (1950) (denial of certiorari means "that fewer
than four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review a decision of the
lower court as a matter 'of sound judicial discretion.' . . . The court has said
this /again, and again; again and again the admonition has to be repeated.").
24163 F. 2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947).
'Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417 (1934) (payment by
maker); Dillard v. Farmer's Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925)
(part payment by maker); Barber v. Absher Co., 175 N. C. 602, 96 S. E. 43
(1918) (part payment by maker); Houser v. Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1, 83 S. E. 692
(1914) (part payment by principal) ; Garrett v. Reeves, 125 N. C. 529, 34 S. E.
636 (1899) (part payment by principal) ; Copeland v. Collins, 122 N. C. 619, 30
S. E. 315 (1898) (part payment by maker); Le Duc v. Butler, 112 N. C. 458,
17 S. E. 428 (1893) ; Moore v. Beaman, 111 N. C. 328, 16 S. E. 177 (1892) (part
payment by one obligor); Moore v. Goodwin, 109 N. C. 218, 13 S. E. 772 (1891)
(part payment by principal) ; Green v. Greensboro College, 83 N. C. 449 (1880)
(payment of interest by principal). See also MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAc-
TICE AND PaOCEDURE §134 (1929).
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ment.2 The same rule applies to sureties on a promissory note or bond,
since, as between the maker and the surety, and as between co-sureties,
there is said to be a community of interest and a common obligation,
and a part payment by either maker or surety before the statute has
run will toll the statute as to the others not making the payment.3 The
reasoning of the court seems to be that the surety is primarily liable
along with the maker of the instrument and is, therefore, included
within the rule applicable to joint makers.4
One exception to the rule that a part payment by the maker will
bind the surety is the liability of a surety on a guardian's bond. The
court has held that the liability of such a surety is a conditional liability
and secondary, dependent upon the failure of the guardian to pay the
damages caused by his breach. The payment of principal or interest
renews the obligation of the guardian on the amount due his ward and
sets the statute running over as to the guardian but not as to the
surety.5 The reason for the exception is not clear, since the liability
of any surety is dependent upon the principal's failure to pay.
In an early decision it was held that a payment by a principal before
the statute had run operated as a renewal as to indorsers," but this is
no longer the rule as to indorsers of a promissory note or bond. The
court has since held that the maker of a note and an indorser are not
in the same class, and a payment by the maker before the statute has
run will not start the statute running anew as to accommodation in-
' Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417 (1934) ; Dillard v. Farmer's
Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925). See also N. C. GEN. STAT.§1-27 (1943).
' Dillard v. Farmer's Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925)(signatures appeared on the back of the note, but the court found that the signers
intended to be bound as sureties). A part payment by the surety binds the prin-
cipal. Copeland v. Collins, 122 N. C. 618, 30 S. E. 315 (1898).
'A surety is an original maker, and becomes primarily and absolutely liable,
as much so as the maker.. . ." Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N. C. 557, 560, 53S.E.
430, 432 (1906). See also Tar Heel Bond Co. v. Krider, 218 N. C. 361, 11 S. E.
2d 291 (1940); Dry v. Reynolds, 205 N. C. 571, 172 S. E. 351 (1933); Wachovia
Bank and Trust Co. v. Clifton, 203 N. C. 483, 166 S. E. 334 (1932) ; Broadway
Bank v. Noble, 203 N. C. 300, 165 S. E. 722 (1932); Raleigh Bank and Trust Co.
v. York, 199 N. C. 624, 155 S. E. 263 (1930) ; Barber v. Absher Co., 175 N. C.
602, 96 S. E. 43 (1918) ; Roberson-Ruffin Co. v. Spain, 173 N. C. 23, 91 S. E. 361
(1917).
'Finn v. Fountain, 205 N. C. 217, 171 S. E. 85 (1933). See also Copley v.
Scarlet, 214 N. C. 31, 197 S. E. 623 (1938).
An action must be brought against the surety on a guardian's bond within
three years after the breach thereof. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(6) (1943).
There seem to be no North Carolina cases on part payment of principal or
interest of executor's, administrator's or collector's bonds, but it is suggested that
the same rule should apply to sureties on these bonds since the language of the
statute providing for a guardian's bond, N. C. GEN. STAT. §33-13 (1943), and of
the statute providing for executor's, administrator's and collector's bonds, N. C.
GEN. STAT. §28-34 (1943), is practically identical and since N. C. GEN. STAT.
§1-52(6) (1943) applies to sureties of executors, administrators, collectors and
guardians.
. Garrett v. Reeves. 125 N. C. 529, 34 S. E. 636 (1899).
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dorsers7 or payee indorsers,8 since they are secondarily liable and in a
different class. The same rule applies to a drawer when a drawee has
made a payment on the bill. The drawee and the drawer are in a
different class since the "drawer's liability is a conditional liability,
-dependent upon presentation to the drawee and notice of his failure
[to honor] to the drawer."O
There seems to be one exception to the rule that a payment by the
maker will not stop the running of the statute as to indorsers. Where
there is an agreement that the parties remain bound notwithstanding
an extension of time granted the maker and there were payments of
interest, by the maker, the statute does not begin to run in favor of
indorsers until the maturity date under the last extension agreement.10
The rule that a part payment by the maker will not stop the run-
ning of the statute as to indorsers applies to guarantors. The court has
held that a guarantor and a maker are not in the same class since the
contract of guaranty is collateral to the main debt and a payment by the
maker is a payment on the note, evidencing the principal debt, and
not upon the contract of guaranty which determines the liability of
guarantors.11
In regard to instruments under seal, the ten year statute of limita-
tions applies as against the principal thereto.12 The court has held
"Barber v. Absher Co., 175 N. C. 602, 96 S. E. 43 (1918); Houser v.
Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1, 83 S. E. 692 (1914).
'Le Duc v. Butler, 112 N. C. 458, 17 S. E. 428 (1893).
' "To give this effect [payment by one binds all in the same class] to the act
of one, there must be a community of interest and a common obligation among
them. They must be obligors on a bond, makers of a promissory note, drawers
or acceptors of a bill, or joint indorsers of either. Thus if one of several joint
acceptors promises to pay as directed in the statute, or makes a payment, his
associate acceptors are bound by what he does; but the drawers are not because
there is no such common interest and responsibility as gives legal force to the
act." Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76, 80 (1883).
10 Nance v. Hulin, 192 N. C. 665, 135 S. E. 774 (1926). See also The Fidelity
Bank v. Hessee, 207 N. C. 71, 175 S. E. 826 (1934).
To make indorsers sureties, appropriate words must appear upon the instru-
ment itself or in some writing attached thereto. A resolution passed by a board
of directors which stated that as between the maker and the indorsers all would
be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the note was held not to be
sufficient to make indorsers primarily liable along with the maker. Waddell v.
Hood, 207 N. C. 250, 176 S. E. 558 (1934). See also Meyers Co. v. Battle, 170
N. C. 168, 86 S. E. 1034 (1915); Houser v. Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1, 83 S. E. 692
(1914) ; Perry v. Taylor, 148 N. C. 362, 62 S. E. 423 (1908).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §25-69 (1943) provides that a person placing his signature
upon an instrument, othervise than a maker, drawer, or acceptor, is deemed to be
an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be
bound in some other capacity. Appropriate words must appear upon the instru-
ment itself or in some writing attached thereto. Waddell v. Hood, 207 N. C.
250, 176 S. E. 558 (1934). Of course, this does not prevent an indorser from
showing that his indorsement was an accommodation indorsement or from showing
that the relation of indorsers as between themselves for purposes of contribution.
Gillam v. Walker, 189 N. C. 189, 126 S. E. 424 (1925).
" Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Clifton, 203 N. C. 483, 166 S. E. 334
(1930). See also cases cited in footnote 4.
'
2N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-47(2) (1943).
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that this statute does not apply to a surety on a sealed instrument,
even though his seal is affixed,1 3 since the use of the word "principal"
and the omission of the word "surety" clearly indicates this to be the
legislative intention,'1 4 therefore, the three year period applies to a
surety. This raises the problem whether or not a principal and a surety
are in the same class, and if they are, will a payment by the principal
bind the surety. If a payment is made before the three year limitation
period has run in favor of the surety, such payment will bind the
surety."'5 This rule is applied without discussing whether the principal
and the surety, in this situation, are in the same class. It would seem
that they are not, since the limitation period is different as to each. In
one case, payments made by the principal after the three year statute
had run in favor of the surety did not revive the statute as to the
surety, although the remedy was not barred as against the principal-
the ten year statute being applicable to him. 6 It should be pointed out
that as to a guaranty under seal, the contract of a guarantor is his own
separate contract and he is, therefore, a principal to the guaranty-a
sealed instrument-and this being a separate contract under seal, the
suit against the guarantor is not barred until ten years after the cause
of action accrued.1 7 The problems which arise when there is a surety
on a sealed instruments do not arise when the guaranty is under seal,
since a payment by the principal will not stop the running of the statute
as to guarantors.
The North Carolina rule follows the old English rule that a pay-
ment of principal or interest by one of two or more joint or joint and
several debtors will make a new running point for the statute as to all
the other debtors.' The only apparent difference is that the English
rule was based upon the theory that a payment by one was a payment
for all, the one acting as agent for the others, while the North Carolina
rule is based on the theory that there is a community of interest and a
"=Barnes v. Crawford, 201 N. C. 434, 160 S. E. 464 (1931); Redmond v.
Pippen, 113 N. C. 90, 18 S. E. 50 (1893).
The three-year statute of limitations applies to accommodation indorsers even
though their signatures are under seal. Howard v. White, 215 N. C. 130, 1 S. E.
2d 356 (1939).
"4 Barnes v. Crawford, 210 N. C. 434, 160 S. E. 494 (1931).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(1) (1943) is applicable to sureties and an action
against them is limited to three years.
" Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417 (1934) ; Redmond v. Pippen,
113 N. C. 90, 18 S. E. 50 (1893).
1 "Davis v. Alexander, 207 N. C. 417, 177 S. E. 417 (1934).
If a person whose signature appears on the face of a sealed instrument is sued
as principal thereto, as between the payee and the signers, he may prove by parol
evidence that to the knowledge of the payee he signed the instrument as surety
and not as maker and as to him the three-year statute applies. Davis v. Alexander,
supra.
7 Coleman v. Fuller, 105 N. C. 328, 11 S. E. 175 (1890).
28 Whitcomb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. K. B. 652, 99 Eng. Reprint 413 (1781).
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common obligation among them.10  The English courts seem to have
recognized the hardship of the rule and applied it with considerable
reluctance,20 until it was abolished by statute in 1856.21
The majority of American jurisdictions have repudiated the old
English rule, without the aid of statutes, and hold that a part payment
of principal or interest by one of two or more joint or joint and several
debtors sets the statute running anew only as to the person making the
payment.22 Some states have statutes expressly providing that one joint
debtor shall not lose the benefit of the statute of limitations by reason
of a part payment by a co-obligor.2 A few states still apply the old
English rule. 24  Most of the courts of this country, before abolishing
the rule entirely, made a distinction between cases where the statute
had fully run and where it had partially run.2 5 North Carolina, by
statute, has preserved this distinction. The statute provides that no
act, admission, or acknowledgment by one of the makers of a promis-
sory note or bond after the statute has barred the same, is evidence to
repel the statute except as against the maker doing the act or making
the admission.2 6
It is hard to understand how, in any case, the unauthorized payment
by one party, though he be jointly or jointly and severally bound, can
1" Dillard v. Farmer's Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925);
Wood v. Barber, 90 N. C. 76 (1883).
" Atkins v. Tredgold, 2 Barn. & C. 23, 107 Eng. Reprint 291 (1823) ; Brandran
v. Wharton, 1 Barn. & Aid. 463, 106 Eng. Reprint 170 (1818).
MERCANTILE LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 19 & 20 Victoria, c. 97, §14 (1856).
' Mohas v. Kasiska, 47 Idaho 179, 276 Pac. 315 (1929) (the court had be-
fore it a statute similar to N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-26 (1943); held, payment of
interest or principal is equivalent to a new promise in writing duly signed and
the written promise binds only the person signing it, therefore payment necessarily
binds only the person who makes it); Northwest Thresher Co. v. Dahltorp, 104
Minn. 130, 116 N. W. 106 (1908) (guarantors, sureties, joint makers); Monidah
Trust Co. v. Kemper, 44 Mont. 1, 118 Pac. 811 (1911) (joint obligors, joint and
several obligors, sureties; held, the effect of part payment is no greater than a
written acknowledgment and a written acknowledgment could only bind the party
making it) ; Hall v. Rogers, 113 Neb. 290, 202 N. W. 908 (1925) (surety, joint
obligors) ; White v. Pittsburgh Vein Coal Co., 266 Pa. 145, 109 Atl. 873 (1920)
(joint debtors); Peoples Bank v. Hastings, 263 Pa. 260, 106 AtI. 308 (1919)
(surety) ; Butts v. Georgetown Mutual Bldg., 142 S. C. 353, 140 S. E. 700 (1927)
(joint debtors).
22 COLO. STAT. c. 102, §§25, 26 (1935); ME. REV. STAT. c. 99, §108 (1944);
MASS. ANNO. LAWS c. 260, §§14, 15 (1933); MIcHr. STAT. ANNO. c. 27, §§617,
618 (1935) ; VT. STAT. c. 82, §§1708, 1709 (1947).
2" Meisner v. Pattee, 170 Ark. 217, 279 S. W. 787 (1926) (payment of in-
terest by joint maker); Hunter v. Robertson, 30 Ga. 479 (1860); Hooper v.
Hooper, 81 Md. 155, 31 At. 508 (1895) (joint makers) ; Highland Invest. Co. v.
Kansas City Computing Scales Co., 277 Mo. 365, 209 S. W. 895 (1919) (payment
of interest by principal) ; Smith v. Dowden, 92 N. J. L. 317, 105 Atl. 720 (1919) ;
Mason v. Kilcourse, 71 N. J. L. 472, 59 AtI. 21 (1904) ; Ford v. Schall, 110 Ore.
21, 221 Pac. 1052 (1924) (payment of interest by joint maker); Woonsocket
Institution for Savings v. Ballou, 16 R. I. 351, 16 At. 144 (1888) (payment by
maker).
51 WILISTON ON CONTRACrS §193 (1936).28N. C. GN. STAT. §1-27 (1943).
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be admitted to enlarge or extend the obligation of another jointly or
jointly and severally bound. Logically and upon principle there can be
but one answer. No such authorization or agency exists, or can be
implied, from the joint contract as will authorize one to act for and
bind the others so as to renew or extend their liability, where the rela-
tionship is merely that of joint debtors. If resort were had to principle
instead of precedent it is difficult to see how the unauthorized payment
by one could bind his co-debtorY.2  It also appears that there is no
practical reason why a part piyment by the principal should toll the
statute as to a surety but not as to a guarantor, since both the surety
and the guarantor, in the real sense, serve the same purpose-to secure
the debt of the debtor. Since N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-27 (1943) is piece-
meal legislation, it is suggested that the statute be amended to provide
that a payment by a party to an obligation, whether payment be made
before or after the statute of limitations has barred the obligation, shall
set the statute running over again only as to the party making the
payment.
PERRY C. HENSON.
Pleadings-General Allegation of Negligence
Until recently it was a settled rule in North Carolina that a general
allegation that -defendant was negligent was an insufficient pleading of
the facts which constituted plaintiff's cause of action,' and as such was
subject to demurrer. 2  This rule underwent a change in the recent case
of Davis v. Rhodes,3 a negligent wrongful death action. There the
questioned allegation was "that defendant unlawfully, recklessly and
negligently struck and collided" with the motor scooter on which the
intestate was riding. This general allegation was held sufficient.
This change was discussed in a recent note,4 where it was pointed
-' Campbell v. Brown, 86 N. C. 376 (1882).
'Whitehead v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co., 190 N. C. 197, 129 S. E.
602 (1925) (plaintiff used phone to report fire but could not secure connections;
an allegation that defendant was negligent in not responding to his call was held
insufficient); Thomason v. Durham & Northern R. R., 142 N. C. 318, 55 S. E.
205 (1906) (allegation that plaintiff suffered damage "from smoke, noise, odors
and vibrations resulting from operation of defendant's railroad"; held, no cause of
action stated); Conley v. Richmond & Danville Ry., 109 N. C. 69Z 14 S. E. 303
(1891) (averment stated that intestate was killed and slain by the negligence
of defendant; held too general) ; cf. Lanier v. Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200,
98 S. E. 593 (1919) (plaintiff alleged that he was "induced to sign a deed by
fraud"; held, insufficient); Citizens Bank v. Cahagan, 210 N. C. 464, 187 S. E.
580 (1936) (allegation that a certain sum was then due and owing held insufficient).
2 "The defendant may demur to the complaint when it appears upon the face
thereof that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action." N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-127 (1943).
S231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949).
'29 N. C. L. RLy. 89 (1950).
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